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Abstract

Feeder Cattle Buyer Market Areas and the Price
Impact of Buyer Concentration

The size and shape of market areas for buyers in the Dodge City, Amarillo, Omaha,
and Greeley feeding sites are determined by plotting data from the nation's largest video
auction. Buying areas for feeder cattle are large, irregularly shaped, and, in some cases,
truncated. Feeder cattle buyers behave as oligopsonists in counties where most buyers are
from one feeding site. Prices are higher for feeder cattle in counties where two or more
market areas overlap.
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Feeder Cattle Buyer Market Areas and the Price
Impact of Buyer Concentration

Introduction
Defining relevant market areas is critical in testing for market power, yet describing
market areas is difficult. Studies of market power in cattle markets usually have investigated
fed cattle markets and have used U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) buyer
concentration information for areas within political boundaries such as states or areas
defined by the researchers within and/or across state boundaries (Menkhaus, St. Clair, and
Abmaddaud; Ward).
The large and rapid consolidation of the beefpacking industry during the past 15
years has motivated much of the research assessing market power in cattle markets (e.g.,
Schroeter; Menkhaus, St. Clair, and Ahmaddaud; Ward; Marion, Geithman, and Quail).
This consolidation has increased concern that packer market power may have increased at
the farm and/or wholesale levels (Purcell) and is evidenced by the Packers and Stockyards
Administration of the USDA recently funding several research projects designed to identify
fed cattle mark~t areas. Improved definitions of fed cattle market areas are important since
some past research finds high packer concentration lowers producer prices (Marion,
Geithman, and Quail) and some does not (e.g., Menkhaus, St. Clair and Abmaddaud;
Ward).

Different researchers use different methods and different data, but the

inconsistencies may be due to how market areas are defined.
Besides consolidation at the packer level, major structural changes have occurred at
other points in the beef marketing channel. For example, feedlots close to large packing
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facilities are growing, l and contracts between packers and feedlots are more common
(Ward; Schroeder et al.). These structural changes (number, size, and location of firms)
suggest feeder cattle buyers may practice spatial price discrimination (Greenhut and
Benson) between cattle purchased within their own market area and in locations where
market areas overlap. A test of monopsonistic buyer behavior in feeder cattle markets
should include a clear delineation of market areas since buyers in spatially separated
markets probably do not compete directly in every location (Bailey and Peterson).

If defining market areas for fed cattle is difficult, defining market areas for feeder
cattle is even more so. Little public information is available concerning the movement of
feeder cattle. USDA reports price ranges for feeder cattle at numerous markets, such as
auctions and direct sales, but does not report the origin or destination of the cattle and does
not report either buyer or seller concentration in specific feeder cattle markets.
Since secondary data identifying relevant feeder cattle market areas are not publicly
available, primary data provided by the nation's largest cattle video auction are used to
determine market areas. Cattle sold at the video auction come from most major feeder
cattle production areas. Buyers from all major cattle feeding locations participate, making
it possible to study the size and shape of several different market areas.
Feeder cattle market areas are identified in this study by mapping the location of
cattle purchased at the video auction. Major feeding sites are identified by mapping the
feeder cattle's destination.
Besides mapping cattle locations at the time of purchase, this study also determines
the price impact of buyer concentration. Buyer concentration is calculated for each county
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where cattle were purchased based on the market shares of major feeding sites (e.g., western
Kansas, Texas/Oklahoma Panhandle, etc.). A regression determines if feeder cattle prices
in each county are lower as the concentration of buyers from central feeding sites increases.

Spatial Market Theory

The sizes and shapes of market areas have been addressed frequently in the literature
during the last several decades. Classical spatial theory suggests that spatial markets tend
to be monopolistically competitive2 and that market areas tend to be shaped as hexagons
with processing plants near the center of the market area (Chamberlin; Bressler and King;
Greenhut). The hexagonal shape appeared to be the ideal since circular market areas can
not cover complete areas without overlap and since

tI • • •

overlapping would be eliminated

by producers in making their free choice of most favorable outlets" (Bressler and King,

p. 144).
However, the monopolistically competitive model assumes that the distribution of
resources and population of buyers and sellers are evenly distributed across space
(Greenhut). Both of these assumptions are violated in feeder cattle markets. Feeder cattle
J

production is distributed unevenly because of an uneven distribution of feed resources.
Feeder cattle buyers are located near processing plants (see endnote 1).
Greenhut (p. 54) argues that when buyers and sellers are unevenly distributed over
space, monopolistic competition cannot describe the behavior of firms.

As a result,

oligopoly, or in this case oligopsony theory, may provide a more descriptive model of feeder
cattle buyer behavior than monopolistic competition. That is, feeder cattle buyers likely are
awa re of and react to the actions of other feeder cattle buyers. Being able to ide ntify and
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separate market areas empirically is the first step in identifying market power (Greenhut
and Benson; Stigler and Sherwin).
Some recent efforts to identify spatial pricing relationships and/or empirical market
areas have used Granger causality (e.g., Howell; Bailey and Brorsen). However, Granger
causality occasionally yields spurious results (Bessler and Kling).

Stigler and Sherwin

suggest that a simple test for correlation between two parallel price series is sufficient to
determine if one market or two exists.
In this study, shipment data are used to identify empirical market areas for feeder
cattle, although shipment data may not always be appropriate to identify relevant market
areas since one region can be an effective competitor even if no commodity is actually
shipped to another region (Greenhut and Benson, p. 8). Thus, the relevant market area for
feeder cattle is actually larger than might be identified with shipment data. However, the
results presented here will show that market areas for buyers from major cattle feeding sites
are large and overlap substantially. Also, almost 24,000 observations are used to complete
the market area maps presented in this paper suggesting that any underestimation of the
size of market ?reas is likely small.

Model

A competitive input market specifies that the price of an input (i.e., feeder cattle)
equals the value of its marginal product (VMP) to the buyer while monopsonists or
oligopsonists are able to purchase a factor(s) at a price below its VMP (Greenhut, p. 195).
Consequently, a test for oligopsonistic behavior in feeder cattle markets should include a
te t for differences between feeder cattle prices a nd buyers' VMPs.
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McAfee and McMillan postulate that in competitive auctions successful bids are
equal to the valuation of the bidder with the second highest VMP, or bim

= VMPjm(2)'

As

the number of bidders increases, the VMP of the second highest bidder would approach the
VMP of the highest bidder. The price would approach the VMP of the highest bidder only
when the auction has a large number of participants.
Feeder cattle buyers separated by space have market power if they pay less for cattle
when they face less competition from buyers in other areas? Buyers may purchase nearby
cattle at prices below VMP when faced with little competition from outside buyers because
of freight costs to distant areas. Oligopoly theory calls this phenomenon phantom freight,
where sellers at one location set their price equal to the nearest competitor's mill price plus
freight (Greenhut, p. 139). With oligopsony, buyers in one location may price feeder cattle
at a price equal to the price paid by buyers at a competing location minus freight costs to
the competing location.
If monopsony exists, the buyer can pass all freight costs on to sellers in the form of
reduced prices. However, if buyers from one feeding location, say Site A, procure cattle
from another f<1eding location, say Site B, they likely compete with buyers from Site B who
are closer to the cattle than they are. Site A may be forced to absorb part of the freight
costs for cattle purchased from Site B in order to compete with buyers from Site B. The
notion of freight absorption (Greenhut and Benson, pp. 25-6) suggests that buyers competing
across market areas are expected to cover a portion of the freight costs for the feeder cattle
they are purchasing at the video auction. The number of miles each lot of cattle were
shipped (MILES) is included in a regression model described in the next section. The
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regression coefficient for MILES serves as a measure of how much prices are reduced to
cover freight costs from the seller's location and, consequently, measures how much of the
freight costs are being absorbed by buyers.

Regression Model

Successful bids at cattle auctions are a function of cattle quality, market conditions,
merchandising strategies, and market structure (Schroeder et al.; Buccola; Bailey, Brorsen,
and Fawson; Faminow and Gum). A hedonic model for successful feeder cattle bids is the
following:
J

(1)

bm

where m

= 80 +

K

L

:E cjLCmj + :E dkMCmk + :E f,MSm , +

j-1

k-1

em '

/-1

= 1, 2, 3, ... , M, and M is the number of lots sold during a particular auction;

b m is the highest bid on the mth lot; LC mj is the /h lot characteristic for the mth lot of cattle
(including merchandising strategies); MCmk is the

kth

market condition; MS ml is the Ith

market structure measure; e is the error term; ao is the intercept; and the c's, d's, and f's are
parameter estimates.

A summary index, the Herfindahl Index (HI), is used in equation (1) to measure
buyer concentration in each county based on buyer location (Koch). A summary measure
of concentration is not often used in studies examining market power since information on
all buyers is required to calculate such a measure.

However, summary measures of

concentration give more reliable estimates of the price effect of market concentration than
market share ratios (Cotterill). The Herfindahl Index in the fh county (HIj ) is calculated
as:
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N

(2)

HI]

=

~

(MS;])

J

n-1

where N is the number of buyer market areas; n

=

1, 2, 3, ... , 8; and MS is each area's

market share in county j. The test for price discrimination by feeder cattle buyers in a
county is a one-tailed t-test of the hypothesis that the coefficient of HI in equation (1) is less
than zero.
The independent variables of equation (1) are defined in Table 1. The video auction
data are cross-section time-series but with unequal numbers of cross-section observations.
Contemporaneous correlation can be expected among the cross-section observations. The
parameters of equation (1) were estimated with a one-way random effects model with the
random effects being associated with time (Judge et al.). LIMDEP's feasible generalized
least-squares algorithm for panel data is used to estimate the parameters.
Since the parameters of equation (1) are estimated using only successful bids,
selection bias (Greene, pp. 708-713) is possible. Approximately 20% of the lots offered on
the Superior Livestock Auction (SLA) during the study period did not sell (i.e., the offered
bid was rejected by the seller). The null hypothesis of no selectivity bias was tested by first
calculating the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) based on a probit model of whether each lot sold
or not. The IMR was then included as a regressor in equation (1). The coefficient of IMR
was not significantly different than zero, and, therefore, selectivity bias did not appear to
affect the parameter estimates.
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Table 1. Independent Variables Used in the Feeder Cattle Price Madela

Independent Variables
Lot Characteristics

Sex:

steers *
heifers
Number in lot (NUMBER)
Average estimated weight
in lbs. (WEIGHT)
Number-squared (HDSQ)
Weight-squared (WSQ)
Truckloads: At least 40,000 lbs. (TRUCK)
Fewer than 40,000 lbs. *
Sorting:
Lots mixed by sex (Mixed) *
Lots unmixed by sex
Weight Risk (WRISK)b
Miles to delivery point designated
by buyer (MILES)
Breed: Hereford *, English-Cross,
English- Exotic-Cross,
Exotic-Cross, Angus, Dairy
Flesh:

Heavy, Medium-Heavy (MH),
Medium (MF),
Medium-Heavy (MMH), Medium (MF),
Light-Medium (LM), Light*

Location at time of sale:
Western States (West)C
South d
Midwest*e
Upper Midwest (Upper)f
West Coast (WCoast)g
Low~r Southwest (LSW)h
East'
Market Characteristics
Feeder Cattle Futures price (Futures)
Seasonality: 1st quarter*
2nd quarter
3rd quarter
4th quarter
Days to delivery (Date)
Market Structure

HIj
Year Dummies: 1987-89
1990-92*

Frame: Large, Medium-Large (ML),
Medium (MED), Medium-Small (MS),
Small*
Horns: No horns, Some horns, Horned*
Uniformity: Uniform lot*
Nonuniform lot
*Base for a set of binary variables such as sex, breed, etc.
aSee equation (1).
bThe ratio of an acceptable variance in weight above the estimated delivery weight (no discount) and the price
slide in cents specified by the seller.
CMontana, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada.
dMississippi, Florida, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky.
eNebraska, Kansas, Colorado, Missouri, Illinois, and Iowa.
fSouth Dakota, North Dakota, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.
gCalifornia, Arizona, Oregon, and Washington.
~Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico.
~States east of Illinois and north of Kentucky.
JThe t-statistic for the Herfindahl Index tests the hypothesis that b m = VMP mo.
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The expected signs of the coefficients of the lot characteristics and market conditions
are similar to those in past research (e.g., Schroeder et al.; Bailey and Peterson; Faminow
and Gum; Buccola). For example, holstein steers are expected to receive lower prices than
English breeds since holsteins have lower meat yields and lower feed efficiency than English
breeds. Large-framed cattle are expected to receive premiums over small-framed cattle due
to higher feed efficiency and higher cutability. Cattle sold in at least truckload lots that
were unmixed by sex are expected to receive higher prices than cattle shipped in short loads
and then sorted by sex after sale. Prices are also adjusted for cattle location to account for
quality and reputation differences among cattle from different parts of the country (Bailey,
Brorsen, and Fawson).

Data
Superior Livestock Auction of Brush, Colorado, provided price and buyer information
for cattle sold and buyers' names between January 1987 and December 1992. During the
data period, SLA held 103 video sales and sold almost 3 million feeder cattle. 4 All cattle
sold through SLA are delivered FOB at the ranch or at a nearby scale. Mileage between
cattle location at the time of SLA's sale and the destination specified on SLA's shipment
records was used to measure price differentials due to buyer transportation costs.
Approximately 20% of the lots had no destination specified. In this case, average mileage
for the other lots was used.

The location of each lot of cattle was established from

information included in SLA's sales catalogues. Lot characteristics were also obtained from
SLA's sales catalogues.

10

Mapping Market Areas for Major Feeding Sites
Major feeder cattle feeding sites and their associated market areas can be best
illustrated by plotting the data. Major buyer locations are identified by mapping the density
of shipments to each county on a map of the United States. Conversely, seller locations are
identified by plotting the density of purchases from each county. Maps of the density of
purchases by buyers from the major feeding sites are then made with dots representing 50
head of feeder cattle purchased. Based on the mapping of destinations, four major feeding
sites were identified--the area along the Missouri River in Nebraska and Iowa (Omaha); the
Nebraska Panhandle, southeastern Wyoming, and northeastern Colorado (Greeley); western
Kansas and southeastern Colorado (Dodge City); and the Texas/Oklahoma Panhandle
(Amarillo) (figure 1).

The remainder of the United States is divided into the West,

Northern Plains, Southern Plains, and the East. The mappings for seller locations identifies
the market area associated with each feeding site based on shipments to the central feeding
area.

Results

Market Area Maps
Figures 2 through 5 present the density maps of feeder cattle purchases. These maps
demonstrate that the market areas are not hexagons as assumed in the classic spatial model
(Bressler and King). New theory is needed to describe the way spatial markets really work
since, as demonstrated here, market areas for feeder cattle are large and irregularly shaped.
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High-buying densities would be expected near the center of the four feeding sites,
since transportation costs are lower than from outlying areas; and when one examines
figures 2 through 5, this appears to be the case. However, there are areas removed from
the center of the feeding sites where purchases are quite dense. For example, the buying
densities are comparatively high in southern Arizona for the Dodge City and Greeley
feeding areas (figures 4 and 5).5
Transportation costs partly determine the market area for feeder cattle.

For

example, buying densities of the Amarillo feeding area are large south of the feeding center,
while buying densities for the Dodge City feeding area are high in Colorado and areas north
of Colorado than the buying densities for the Arnarillo feeding area buyers. This implies
that Kansas buyers compete little with the Texas/Oklahoma Panhandle buyers in the area
south of the Texas Panhandle, and Panhandle buyers do not compete well with Kansas
buyers north of the Texas Panhandle. In general, buyers in the Omaha feeding area have
a comparative advantage in purchasing cattle located in the Dakotas, while buyers in the
Greeley feeding area concentrate their purchases in Colorado. Purchases by buyers from
the Amarillo

f~eding

area are centered mostly south of Kansas.

Buyers in the Dodge City feeding area spread their purchases more evenly across the
other regions than buyers from the other three areas. However, the relative absence of
purchases in the western Kansas area by buyers outside of the Dodge City feeding area is
striking (figure 3). Buyers in western Kansas appear relatively more aggressive about buying
cattle close to the market center than buyers in other areas.
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Test for Price Differences in the Market Areas
Resulting from Buyer Concentration
Table 2 presents the feasible generalized least-squares parameter estimates of the
hedonic price model measuring the price impacts of concentration by buyers from different
feeding sites (equation (1». Parameter estimates and signs of the parameter of lot and
market characteristics are similar to the results of past studies using hedonic price models
of feeder cattle prices (e.g., Buccola; Faminow and Gum; Schroeder et al.; Schultz and
Marsh).
The parameter estimate for HI (-0.356) indicates counties dominated by buyers from
one feeding site receive lower prices than counties where buyers from several feeding sites
are buying cattle, suggesting feeder cattle buyers are able to discriminate between the prices
they pay for feeder cattle based on location. In the case of monopsony (HI

= 1),

county

price levels for 700-800 lb. steers would be depressed by about $2.50-$3.00 per head. The
results also show that feeder cattle producers, located where two or more market areas
overlap, receive premiums.
Feeder cattle producers in areas with few local buyers can take some comfort in
knowing that market areas for feeder cattle are large. Sellers in outlying areas, however,
are at a disadvantage because of transportation costs. The negative sign of the parameter
estimate for MILES (table 2) suggests sellers distant from the market center effectively pay
part of the buyer's transportation costs. However, some freight absorption did occur since
buyers must cover a large portion of transportation costs for cattle purchased at the SLA
For example, a major livestock trucking firm estimates that during the six-year period of the
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Table 2. Feasible Generalized Least Squares Parameter Estimates for Feeder Cattle
Price Model Measuring the Impact of Market Concentration (Equation (l)t
Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

Intercept

76.468
(34.794)* *

Futures price

0.823
(33.309)**

Steers
Number
Weight

5.167
(83.770)* *
0.001
(5.369)**
-0.151
(-88.764) * *

HDSQ

-0.000
(-1.536)

WSQ

0.000
(57.699)**

BREED:
English-Cross
English-Exotic
Cross

Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

FLESH:
MH

-0.993
(-5.790)**

MF

-0.479
(-4.601)**

FRAME:
Large

2.500
(6.297) * *

ML

1.902
(4.881)* *

MED

1.822
(4.694)**
(3.248)**

HORNS:
No horns

0.988
(8.951)* *

0.458
(2.090)*

Some horns

0.486
(4.969)**

0.568
(2.693)* *

SEASONALITY:

-0.067
(-0.284)

1st quarter

2.143
(6.883)**

Angus

0.325
(1.012)

2 nd quarter

2.653
(7.811)**

Dairy

-7.223
(-27.183)**

3 rd quarter

1.949
(5.886)* *

Exotic-Cross
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Table 2. (Continued)
Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

WRISK

LOCATION:
West
South
Upper

-0.253
(-2.676)* *
-4.371
(-35.753)* *
0.638
(3.276)* '*

W. coast

-3.135
(-24.488) * *

LSW

-1.905
(-21.993)**

Truck

Independent
Variable

0.635
(3.231)* *

Unmixed

-0.176
( -2.327)*

Date

0.013
(13.316)**

Miles
Uniform

Parameter
Estimate
-0.275
(-8.965)* *
-0.001
(-13.007)**
1.067
(11.580)**

MARKET STRUCTURE:
-0.356
(-3.236) * *

Years Dummy
Observations

R2

-2.720
(-8.965)* *
23,717
0.805

*Denotes statistically different than zero at the 5% level.
**Denotes statistically different than zero at the 1% level.
at-values are in parentheses.
bThis is a one-tailed test to determine if prices decline as purchases in a county become dominated by buyers
from one market area (i. e. flo: b m = VMP mn)'
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study, trucking costs for cattle were $0.0027/cwt./mile (L. W. Miller Transportation, Inc.),
while the regression model indicates that prices were reduced by only $0.001/ cwt./mile as
a result of trucking costs (see coefficient for MILES in table 2).

Conclusions
Little information has been available about the size and shape of feeder cattle
market areas. This study presents the buying densities at the SLA during 1987 through 1992
for buyers from four major feeding sites. Feeder cattle market areas are not hexagonal.
They are irregularly shaped and overlap extensively. Thus, new theories are needed to
describe the size and shape of spatial markets. Market areas apparently are determined by
the distribution of feeder cattle and by relative transportation costs, since "pockets" of buying
density occur rather than buying centering only around the center of the feeding site. While
market areas do overlap, some separation between the areas clearly exists. For example,
buyers in the Amarillo feeding area often purchase cattle in the center of the Amarillo
market area and to the south, while buyers in the Dodge City feeding area often buy cattle
at the center of the Dodge City market area and to the north and west.
Feeder cattle buyers act as oligopsonists in counties where most cattle are purchased
by buyers from one feeding site (i.e., they pay a price less than the VMP of the input).
Conversely, sellers of cattle located where two or more market areas overlap receive
premiums since competition is greater than in counties with high buyer concentration.
Although sellers cover a portion of buyers' transportation costs in the form of reduced prices
based on distance from the buyer, buyers still absorb much of these costs. Spatial market
theory suggests buyers are forced to absorb freight co ts of inputs bought in distant locations
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when they are faced with competition from buyers located closer to the input location than
they are (Greenhut and Benson). Also, since purchases are relatively dense close to market
centers and buyer concentration reduces prices, buyers may subsidize transportation costs
of cattle purchased in distant locations by capturing phantom freight on purchases located
near the market center.

Sellers located distant from the market centers should be

encouraged that feeder cattle market areas are large and that some freight absorption is
occurnng.
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Endnotes

1.

The number of feedlots with under 4,000-head capacity declined by almost 42% in the
13 major feeding states between 1980 and 1992, while the number of feedlots with over
4,000-head capacities increased by over 6% during the same period. Marketings by
feedlots with under 4,000-head capacity declined from 39% of total marketings in the
13 states in 1978 to just over 23% of total marketings in 1992. During the same period,
areas with large and/or modernized packing facilities such as Colorado, Kansas, Texas,
Nebraska, and Oklahoma increased the number of fed cattle marketed by 25%, while
marketings in the rest of the 13 major feeding states declined 34% (Western Livestock
Marketing Information Project).

2.

That is, plants tend to act as monopolists within an area determined by transportation
costs and location of other plants.

3.

This assumes that cost structures for buyers within each market area are similar. This
assumption can be justified since the main difference in costs between market areas is
feed costs. However, within a market area, feed costs should be similar for all
operations.

4.

Feeder cattle are defined for this study as steers and heifers not sold as breeding stock.
That is, all steers and heifers weighing less than 1000 lbs. each and not listed as
breeding stock.

5.

This is likely a result of the distribution of feeder cattle and also the level of activity by
SLA representatives in a particular location. Most cattle from southern Arizona and
California are dairy calves from the large dairies in those two states.
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Figure 1. Destinations to which feeder cattle were shipped after purchase, 1987.1992

J

\~,

"

;~::
" '

'.

' . . '!.

• I.

.

. ", ,':, ....
1

,.

'

.-:

,

.

....

--:.!

.., .

• '.\1

'.

,

I,

,

'

:'
"

(,

\

~

,.". 'f'

"~'
,-: ;:i' " ,.,.'
'~,
',)t.,

"'(

", '\,

'.

:"'J.

\~ :1',\ ",:'', ' ,, ",,..' , :f:', ',l3'j,:,
'"

" , (",

:',:' ,

:' .

• •' . ;

a

_..

:..

,":'
':':;~,~,
:,!' '

,

• 1:
.l! :'", :

,- ..,', w···".' .:..
.....• • ,

""'-

••

_. ~.

,.,<,;..~' " ..
' .-:a.: ,..

:. r ~'.' :•. ~

.. • '. ~ ••

0""

..

"

.. i '\'

.:., ,.
~,

-,•. '

~

[EaCh

Dot= 50

Head]

Figure 2. Location of feeder cattle purchased by buyers fron1 the Omaha feeding area, 1987.1992
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Figure 3, Location of feeder cattle purchased by buyers from the Greeley feeding area, 1987-1992
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Figure 4. Location of feeder cattle purchased by buyers from the Dodge City feeding area, 1987-1992
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Figure 5, Location of feeder cattle purchased by buyers from the Alnarilio feeding a rea, 1987-1992

